Book Project
A Place in the Stars: Prestige and Legitimacy in China’s Quest for Space Power
Why does China pursue expensive and attention-grabbing space capabilities with limited material payoffs? To explain this puzzle, I argue that the Chinese Communist Party pursues prestige symbols for domestic mobilization and to legitimate its rule at home. These pursuits, however, have unexpected and adverse international consequences, raising threat perceptions and catalyzing security spirals—which can be particularly destabilizing in the domain of outer space. I draw upon data collected from fieldwork carried out in Mainland China, Hong Kong, and the United States. I use data from interviews with Chinese and American individuals focusing on space policy, as well as Chinese-language memoirs, collected writings, official histories, white papers, journal articles, and military textbooks.
Peer-Reviewed Articles
“Heavenly Mandate: Public Opinion and China’s Space Activities,” Space Policy, Vol.60 2020
China has one of the world’s most advanced space programs, making it important to understand the motives shaping its pursuit of space power. Although analysts have examined the role of Chinese military doctrine in shaping its space ambitions, little is known about the role of China’s public in its space-related activities. As scholars increasingly recognize, China’s government is often highly concerned with domestic public opinion, particularly that of China’s online population. Similarly, China’s most ambitious projects, such as its human spaceflight program, are often used as propaganda aimed at domestic audiences. Public support for China’s space activities could, therefore, play an important role in influencing China’s space policy. To examine how China’s public views China’s space activities, this article draws on findings from a survey (N=1,482) fielded with Chinese respondents in June-July 2020. The article finds that China’s public is largely supportive of investing in human spaceflight and deep space exploration. The survey also indicates that although respondents view the United States as a competitor and a threat, they favor cooperating with the United States in space exploration. Furthermore, the survey finds that China’s public is supportive of international law governing outer space, as well as laws banning the use of space weapons. Overall, this descriptive analysis provides an important first step for understanding the role of public opinion in China’s pursuit of space power.
“Chinese Views on Nuclear Weapons: Evidence from an Online Survey” (with Naomi Egel), Research and Politics July 2021
What are Chinese public attitudes regarding nuclear weapons? Although scholars have studied Chinese elites’ views on nuclear weapons, surprisingly little is known about the views of China’s public. To understand Chinese public views on nuclear weapons, we conduct an online survey (N = 1066) of Chinese respondents. This is, to our knowledge, the first survey of Chinese public attitudes towards nuclear weapons. We find that although Chinese citizens view the possession of nuclear weapons as important for their country’s security, they strongly oppose the use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. We also provide respondents an opportunity to describe their views on nuclear weapons in their own words. Using computer-assisted text analysis, we assess patterns in these open-ended responses and compare across age groups. We find that younger respondents emphasize non-material factors such as having a greater voice internationally, whereas older respondents emphasize self-defense. Overall, this analysis sheds light on the public attitudes that may shape China’s evolving approach to nuclear weapons.
Book Chapters
“Autocracies and Space Policy: New Directions for Research” (Book chapter under contract, Routledge Handbook on Space Policy)
"Chinese Domestic Politics and the Trade War” in Ed. Hua Shiping, The Political Logic of the US-China Trade War, (Forthcoming with Rowman & Littlefield)
“Introduction: The PLA in 2025” (with Roy Kamphausen) in The Chinese People’s Liberation Army in 2025. Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College, the National Bureau of Asian Research and the US Pacific Command, 2015
Under Review
"Rallying and Dividing: Nationalist Rhetoric and its Limits in China" (with Jeremy Wallace)
Observers of Chinese politics have become inured to the frequent incantation that the regime’s legitimacy rests on a combination of strong economic performance and nationalist credentials. Yet strong economic growth in China has been accompanied by rising divisions between the rich and the poor, the coastal and the interior, and, between urban and rural residents. Do nationalist appeals increase domestic unity—papering over within-China divisions, including the urban-rural gap? Or can they have unintended consequences such as exacerbating antagonisms toward domestic varieties of ‘other’? We explore these questions by carrying out a survey experiment in China using nationalist rhetoric by the Chinese Communist Party. We find evidence that although nationalism can reduce domestic grievances, it can simultaneously exacerbate domestic social divisions, leading educated elites to be less supportive of social policies that benefit migrant workers. This analysis provides suggestive evidence that nationalist strategies may have mixed and unintended consequences, both pacifying grievances, while also exacerbating domestic cleavages.
“Status Projects and Domestic Audiences: Evidence from China’s Human Space Program”
What, if anything, do regimes gain domestically by investing in lavish status projects? This article sheds light on the domestic consequences of status projects in world politics by examining the effects of these projects on individual perceptions of social problems. Specifically, I argue that status projects can increase the self-esteem of the national in-group, thereby diverting attention from domestic social problems. I evaluate the effects of status projects by using an original survey experiment (N=1,529) with Chinese respondents. The survey examines the effects of China’s success in human spaceflight on individual perceptions of domestic social problems. I find evidence that status projects reduce individual perceptions of domestic social problems. These effects are stronger when they are explicitly framed with status rhetoric. I also show that these effects are influenced by individual-level factors such as socioeconomic status, finding that diversionary effects are the strongest for middle and upper-middle-income individuals. These results shed light on the domestic incentives for regimes to pursue status even when such policies are at odds with their other material interests. Moreover, these findings provide insight into the domestic political implications of China’s human spaceflight program.
“Playing Second Fiddle: Status Dissatisfaction and Alliance Splits”
“The Future of Chinese Spacepower: Domestic and International Drivers of China’s Space Ambitions’’ in Ed. Heather Venable, The Future of Air and Spacepower: Intersections of Theory and Technology (Under contract with Air University Press)
Works in Progress
“Righteous Fists: Status Anxiety and Conflict in Late Imperial China”
A growing body of scholarship finds that concerns over status are a powerful motive in world politics. Although scholars often focus on the strategic and psychological motivations for states to engage in status signaling behavior, far less is known about the role of bottom-up status concerns in driving state behavior. This article develops a novel theory linking status concerns to grassroots social movements and international conflict. I contend that status concerns can catalyze bottom-up social movements. These movements can back regimes into a corner, forcing them to adopt costly policies that they would not pursue otherwise. I illustrate the argument by examining the Qing Dynasty’s declaration of war on the militarily superior Eight-Nation Alliance. This costly decision—a watershed moment that hastened the collapse of the Qing Dynasty and led to the birth of modern China—cannot be explained without recognizing the role of bottom-up status concerns in pressuring the regime to declare war. I contend that beyond shedding light on this important episode in Chinese history, this case illustrates how grassroots movements can drive states to adopt costly policies that undermine their security interests.
“China’s Space Ambitions from Mao to Now: Prestige and US-China Space Competition”
From building a space station to landing on Mars, China is increasingly ambitious in the domain of outer space. Considering the centrality of space-based technologies to the world economy and American military power, China’s rise as a space power is one of the most significant developments in contemporary world politics. In explaining Chinese motives, analysts often focus on the security and economic motives behind its space activities. Yet China’s most ambitious goals, such as its human and deep space exploration programs only marginally contribute to Chinese economic and military power. This article argues that Chinese domestic prestige considerations are driving it to engage in a suboptimal space build-up; it contends that Chinese domestic prestige concerns divert resources from addressing it main security objectives and exaggerate its technological capabilities. Like other rising powers throughout history, the temptations of prestige distort Chinese policymaking and defy the logic of security maximization. These prestige ambitions can be incredibly destabilizing in the domain of outer space. Because almost every technology in outer space is dual use, ostentatious displays of Chinese space power exaggerate Chinese capabilities and exacerbate threat perceptions abroad, resulting in a nascent security dilemma between the two powers in outer space.
“Space Diplomacy Between Rivals: Lessons from the US-China Space Relationship” (with Teasel Muir-Harmony)
Whether and or how the United States should engage China in outer space is one of the most important questions in space policy today. Despite long-standing restrictive US legislation on bilateral collaborations with China in outer space, increased engagement between the United States and China could have potential benefits such as cost-sharing for space exploration, cooperation on space governance, increased transparency, and may reduce the likelihood of accidents Yet it is often difficult to reach areas of mutual agreement on areas of cooperation. This paper examines prospects for US-China cooperation in outer space within the context of previous examples of space engagement between strategic competitors. Through an analysis of the factors that contributed to space cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, we assess the consequences of this cooperation for American security interests at the time. Based on this analysis, we outline factors that may promote or hinder cooperation in outer space, as well as potential consequences of such bilateral engagement. We then assess how these factors may operate in the context of the US-China space relationship.